Deutsche Bank’s Mallika Sachdeva is out with a big-picture note arguing that semiconductors have quietly become one of the most important drivers of the US dollar.
The headline stat is a stunner: for the first time in modern history, global trade in semiconductors exceeds trade in oil and gas. That’s based on the four quarters through Q2 2026.
More important for FX is where the surpluses are piling up. Chip surpluses in Asia ex-China (Korea, Taiwan, Japan and ASEAN) have now caught up to the petroleum surpluses in the Gulf.
For 50 years the deal was simple: the Gulf sold oil in dollars and recycled the proceeds into Treasuries. Deutsche argues that regime is being superseded, and rather quickly. The difference this time is where the money goes.
Korea is the case study:
- Semiconductor exports are up more than 200% y/y this year
- The chip trade surplus is close to $250 billion
- Chips account for 100% of Korea’s overall trade surplus
- Korean purchases of overseas equities have been five times purchases of overseas bonds over the past two years
- 70% of Korea’s overseas equity holdings are in the US, and it’s 90% for Korean households
So the chip money is going straight back into the US tech companies that are buying the chips. You can see it in the US capital account:
- Foreign purchases of US equities have topped $1 trillion over the past year
- That’s more than double foreign buying of Treasuries
- Even foreign buying of US corporate bonds now exceeds Treasuries
- Most of the increase in equity buying has come from Asia
Why does the US get to be at the center of this when the chips are made in Asia? Because that’s where the profits go. Deutsche cites research showing 70% of semiconductor industry profits flow to US firms, with US companies controlling 87% of revenue in chip design. The manufacturing happens in countries that are all US-aligned.
There’s also a long runway. Hyperscaler capex commitments are estimated at close to $8 trillion out to 2031, and with chips making up more than half the cost of an AI data center, that implies another $4 trillion in chip demand from AI alone.
The risks are the best part of the note.
The first is circularity. Asian chip surpluses are funding US AI stocks, and those surpluses exist because of demand from US AI companies. If demand for compute doesn’t keep pace with the investment, earnings estimates fall, chip demand falls and the foreign equity bid dries up all at once.
The second is that equities are a far shakier foundation than bonds. Realized volatility in the S&P 500 has been three times that of 10-year Treasuries, the Nasdaq is double the S&P and the Philly Semiconductor Index is more than triple. A dollar that depends on equity inflows should be a more volatile dollar.
China is the outlier. It runs a manufactured goods surplus of more than $2 trillion but a persistent deficit in semiconductors, and it isn’t recycling into US markets. Less than 20% of China’s net international assets are in portfolio investments compared to nearly 50% for Korea, Japan and Taiwan. The preference there is gold and hard assets.
Deutsche’s conclusion is that dollar dominance now rests on US technology leadership rather than geopolitical leadership, and on private balance sheets rather than public ones.
This is a compelling framework and it explains a lot about why the dollar has held up even as the Treasury market lost its foreign sponsorship. When the AI trade finally cracks, the FX market is going to feel it in a way it wouldn’t have in the past. This dynamic is one you can see in the day-to-day moves in the FX and equity market and DB highlights why it won’t change any time soon.
This article was written by Adam Button at investinglive.com.
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